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The Demise of the Declaratory Judgment
Action as a Device for Testing the Insurer's
Duty to Defend
J. Patrick Browne*
W HEN A LIABILITY INSURER DEFENDS CLAIMS brought against its
insured, its interests frequently come in conflict with those of
the insured. Over the years, courts and litigants have attempted to
alleviate or eliminate this problem by several methods: providing the
insured with independent counsel to represent his interests; a de-
claratory judgment action to test the insurer's duty to defend; direct
actions by the injured claimant against the insurance company; and
through the imposition on the insurer of an absolute duty to defend
with a reserved right to test coverage at a later date. The second of
these four methods - the declaratory judgment action - has been
the most frequently used and the most effective from the insurer's
point of view.
Heretofore, Ohio has recognized the first two methods, and has
rejected the third and fourth. But a recent decision of the Ohio
Supreme Court has reversed this traditional stand, and has adopted
the fourth method as the exclusive device for eliminating the conflict
of interest in the defense of claims by liability insurers.
The Problem: The Duty to Defend and Conflicts of Interest
The ordinary policy of liability insurance imposes upon the in-
surer the duty of defending claims made against the insured and
reserves to the company the sole right to settle such claims.' Typi-
cally, the language of the policy stipulates that the company shall de-
fend any suit alleging a loss arising out of the risks insured against,
even if the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent,
and that the company may make a settlement of the suit as it deems
expedient.2 Thus, the language of the "defense" clause relates the
* B.S., John Carroll Univ.; MSLS., Case Western Reserve Univ.; J.D., Univ. of Detroit;
Member, Ohio and Michigan Bars; Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland State Univ. Col-
lege of Law.
1 Not all liability policies place the sole right of settlement in the company. Professional lia-
bility policies for example, frequently stipulate that the company may settle a claim only
with the written consent of the insured. Some of these policies, however, go on to state that
if the insured does not consent, and the judgment against him is in excess of the amount the
company would have paid in settlement, the company will not be liable for that excess
amount. Under such a provision the company retains effective control over all settlements,
and the "written consent" provision becomes more illusory than real.
2 The "defense" clause in the standard family combination automobile policy is illustrative
of the point:
[T]he company shall defend any suit alleging such bodily injury or property
damage and seeking damages which are payable under the terms of this policy,
even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent; but
the company may make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as
it deems expedient.
(Continued on next page)
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duty to defend directly to the coverage provided by the policy, and
it has long been held that there is no duty to defend a claim for loss
arising out of a risk not covered by the policy. 3
Where the allegations of the complaint are such that it clearly
appears that the injured party's loss does not arise out of a covered
risk, the company has no duty to defend. 4 But that is the easy case.
Difficulties arise where the allegations of the complaint are insufficient
to relate the loss directly to the coverage provided, where they are
vague on that point, or where they deliberately misstate the facts so
as to bring the claim within the coverage of the policy (e.g., an inten-
tional shooting described as the negligent discharge of a firearm).
The latter case is not infrequent since complaints may describe an
intentional act in terms of negligence solely for the purpose of main-
taining the company as a party, and thereby enhancing the plaintiff's
chance of a large settlement - a chance he might not have if he had
to look to the insured's resources alone. In such cases an investigation
may reveal objective facts which show that the loss is not one aris-
ing out of a covered risk. If that be the case, may the company refuse
a defense on the basis of the objective facts?
(Continued from preceding page)
The language of Section II of the standard homeowners policy is similar, but shows a
slight variation:
This Company shall have the right and duty, at its own expense, to defend any
suit against the insured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or
property damage, even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false
or fraudulent, but may make such investigation and settlement of any claim or
suit as it deems expedient. This Company shall not be obligated to pay any
claim or judgment or to defend any suit after the applicable limit of this Com-
pany's liability has been exhausted by payments of judgments or settlements.
3See Commonwealth Casualty Co. v. Headers, 118 Ohio St. 429, 161 N.E: 278 (1928);
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 144 Ohio St. 382, 59 N.E.2d 199
(1945). In Socony-Vacuum, supra, the court indicated as follows:
It is axiomatic that a policy which contains a provision that the insurer shall
make defense of an action brought to recover damages for which indemnity is
payable even though such action may be groundless, does not require the insurer
to defend a groundless action which is not within the coverage of the policy. 144
Ohio St. at 393, 59 N.E.2d at 203.
4 Thus, in Commonwealth Casualty Co. v. Headers, 118 Ohio St. 429, 161 N.E. 278 (1928),
the injured party sued for assault and battery committed by an agent of the insured. The
company refused to defend and, after successful defense of the suit, the insured brought
an action against the company to recover his costs of defense. In holding the company not
liable, the Supreme Court concluded:
If the insurance company was not required under this policy to reimburse Headers
for damages recovered against him, if any had been recovered, by reason of this
assault, then manifestly the insurance company could not be obligated thereby to
reimburse Headers for attorneys' fees paid by him in defending an action of the
kind here mentioned. The conclusion of the insurance company that the policy
did not cover these injuries was correct. Id. at 433, 161 N.E. at 279.
Again, in Burger v. Continental National American Group, 441 F.2d 1283 (6th Cit.
1971), the court stated:
If it is clear from the petition that there is no potential liability that falls within
the coverage of the policy written by the insurer, then the insurer is not required
to defend the action. 441 F.2d at 1294.
[Vol. 23:423
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The generally accepted answer is that it may not, even when the
objective facts make it clear beyond any doubt that the loss is not
covered by the policy.5 The duty to defend is controlled by the allega-
tions of the complaint, not by objective facts. If the allegations of
the complaint bring the claim within the coverage of the policy, the
company must provide a defense. As stated in paragraph 1 of the
syllabus of Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental Casualty Co. :6
The duty of a liability insurance company under its policy
to defend an action against its insured is determined from
the plaintiff's petition, and when that pleading brings the
action within the coverage of the policy of insurance, the
insurer is required to make defense regardess of its ulti-
mate liability to the insured.
The allegations of the complaint are said to be the "sole" test of the
company's duty to defend.7
This being the case, an inevitable conflict of interest must exist
between the company and its insured where the allegations of the
complaint bring the action within the policy coverage, but the ob-
jective facts show that the loss is not covered. Although the company
must defend, its interests will best be served if the defense can be
handled in such a way that the facts finally established by the injured
SSee Bloom-Rosenblum-Kline Co. v. Union Indemnity Co., 121 Ohio St. 220, 167 N.E.
884 (1929):
If an action be brought to recover damages for injuries claimed to have been
inflicted by the owner of an automobile, which, as a matter of fact was nowhere
in the vicinity of the accident and was therefore in no wise involved in the ac-
cident, the owner is nevertheless compelled to make a defense, though the claim
against him be entirely groundless- whether it be groundless because the owner
was in no wise at fault, or because his automobile was in fact not involved in the
collision. It would of course be absurd to claim that the insurance company hav-
ing entered into an agreement such as contained in the policy in question would
not be liable for the expenses incurred in making such defense, because, as a
matter of fact, the automobile covered by its policy was not involved in the acci-
dent. 121 Ohio St. at 227, 167 N.E. at 886.
6144 Ohio St. 382, 59 N.E.2d 199 (1945).
See Lessak v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. of New York, 168 Ohio St. 153, 151 N.E.2d
730 (1958). Paragraph 2 of the Lessak syllabus expands somewhat on paragraph 1 of the
Socony-Vacuum syllabus, but does not materially change it:
The sole test as to the duty of an insurance company, under a policy of liability
insurance, to defend an action against the insured is the allegations of the petition
in the action against the insured, and where such petition brings the action within
the coverage of the policy, the insurer is required to make defense, regardless of
the ultimate outcome of the action or the liability to the insured. (Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 144 Ohio St. 382, approved and followed.)
This language was followed in paragraph 2 of the syllabus of Motorists Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Trainor, 33 Ohio St. 2d 41, 294 N.E.2d 874 (1973), but again, the Socony-
Vacuum case is said to be "approved and followed," so it would be reasonable to suppose
that the additional language put in the syllabus was not intended as a material change to
the Socony-Vacuum test. Just as a matter of interest, it might be noted. that Burger v.
Continental National American Group, 441 F.2d 1293 (6th Cir. 1971) reverts to the
language of Sdcony-Vacuum, but all that this probably indicates is that the language of
the two syllabi may be used interchangeably.
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party's suit remove the case from coverage. The insured on the other
hand, will be equally interested in the opposite result. In addition, if
the insured is impecunious, the injured party will share his interest
against that of the company, and the situation is ripe for collusion
between them to the company's detriment.
This places an insufferable burden upon defense counsel. Despite
the old adage that no man can serve two masters, defense counsel
is held to be counsel to both the insured and the insurer. He must
treat both equally, giving to each any and all information, analysis,
aid, or advice relating to the conduct of the defense.8 In a conflicts
case the defense counsel selected by the company must walk a very
thin line; any favoritism shown to one of his two clients may be a
breach of ethics 9 which might justify the other in bringing a mal-
practice action against him.
The Solutions to the Problem
The Independent Counsel Ploy
Over the years, the insurance companies have cast about for
various ways to avoid the conflict of interest situation. One such
method, and the least expensive from the company's point of view,
is the assumption of the defense under a reservation of rights or a
nonwaiver agreement,10 with a recommendation to the insured that
8 Thus, in Netzley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Ohio App. 2d 65, 296 N.E.2d 550
(1971), the court said:
Here, by the terms of the liability insurance policy, Nationwide was obligated to
defend with counsel of its choice any damage action brought against the insured
Mr. Netzley, which action sought damages for personal injury or destruction of
property. Nationwide informed Mr. Netzley that he could obtain additional
counsel to represent him, but he did not choose to do so but, rather, relied upon
legal counsel for Nationwide to protect his interests. In furtherance of such
attorney-dient relationship, it appears from the record that Mr. Netzley had
several conferences with counsel, attended a deposition with counsel, and re-
viewed the scene of the accident with counsel.
I do not believe that it can be effectively argued that trial counsel for Na-
tionwide was only incidentally legal counsel for the insured. Even though Na-
tionwide may have only been specifically interested in the law suit to the extent
of its liability under the contract of insurance, the legal counsel retained by Na-
tionwide was, or should have been, interested in the handling and trial of the
cause in its totality.
We hold that both Nationwide as well as Mr. Netzley, its insured, were
clients of the legal counsel retained by Nationwide. Further, we hold that both
clients had a mutuality of interest in all of the affairs related to such cause of
action, and both were equally entitled to any and all information, analysis, aid,
or advice relating to such matter. 34 Ohio App. 2d at 78-79, 296 N.E.2d at
561-562.
9 Kaudern v. Allstate Ins. Co., 277 F. Supp. 83 (D.C.N.J. 1967).
10 An unqualified assumption of the defense will result in a waiver or estoppel against the
company with respect to the question of coverage. See Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New
York v. Blausey, 49 Ohio App. 556, 197 N.E. 385 (1934); Borovich v. Fountain, 94
Ohio L. Abs. 377, 199 N.E.2d 753 (Ct. App. 1964). But the assumption of the defense
pursuant to a timely reservation of rights or nonwaiver agreement will not work an
estoppel or waiver. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Trainor, 33 Ohio St. 2d 41, 294
(Continued on next page)
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he obtain independent counsel to represent his interests. In such case,
however, the company retains direction and control of the defense.
This does not provide a completely trouble-free solution. If the
insured does hire his own independent counsel, the presence of two
defense counsel, at least partially contending against each other, pre-
sents the plaintiff with a ready-made "divide and conquer" situation.
Further, this could lead to collusion between plaintiff's counsel and
the insured's own counsel. Again, even if the facts established at the
trial of the injured party's action bring the claim within the coverage
of the policy, the insured will still have to bear the cost of retaining
independent counsel to represent him, and he will thus have lost the
full benefit of the policy's "defense" clause, a benefit for which he has
paid a premium, and to which he is entitled. In short, he will have to
pay, at least partially, the cost of defense, and, to the extent of that
payment, he has not received that which is due him under the policy.
Finally- and perhaps this is the most damning objection of all -
the average insured cannot afford the cost of independent counsel,
and is thus forced by economic necessity to forego the protection such
counsel might give his interests, and to rely for protection on the
counsel selected by the company.11
The Supreme Court of Ohio has supplied a palliative to this latter
situation by holding that when the company recommends to the in-
sured that he employ independent counsel, the company must pay
that counsel's fees and expenses. Thus, in Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v.
Continental Casualty Co., the Court said:
If the plaintiff, Harper, were to recover, it would be to the
insurer's interest to have the recovery based on the sole
ground that Northam was an employee of insured and guilty
of negligence in the course of his employment, because the
policy did not cover loss for injuries caused by any employee
(Continued from preceding page)
N.E.2d 874 (1973). However, the consent of the insured to a bilateral nonwaiver agree-
ment cannot be made a condition precedent to the assumption of the defense where the
allegations of the complaint clearly bring the claim within the policy coverage. If the in-
sured will not freely consent to the bilateral nonwaiver agreement, the company must
defend under a reservation of rights. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Trainor, supra.
This latter case describes these two devices:
A bilateral nonwaiver agreement disclaims liability under the terms of the policy,
reserves to each party his respective rights, and provides that the insurer will de-
fend the suit at its own expense, and that nothing which is done under the agree-
ment will be deemed to constitute a waiver of his respective rights. A unilateral
reservation of rights is a notice given by the insurer that it will defend the suit,
but reserves all rights it has based on noncoverage under the policy. 33 Ohio St.
at 45, 294 N.E.2d at 877.
11Netzley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Ohio App. 2d 65, 296 N.E.2d 550 (1971). For
an overview of the cost problem, see Hearings on the Efect of Legal Fees on the Adequacy
of Representation Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. 1, at 97 (1973).
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of the insured; but it would be to insured's interest to have
such recovery based upon a ground that brought the judg-
ment within the coverage of the policy.
Thus in making defense the interest of the insurer came
into conflict with the interest of the insured. The insurer
sought to avoid any liability to indemnify insured for re-
coverable damages by giving notice of claimed nonliability,
inviting the insured to employ counsel of its own choice for
its own protection and allowing them to participate in the
case and by attempting at the same time to perform its (in-
surer's) conceded contractual obligation to defend by re-
quiring its own counsel to keep control of the defense at
all times.
As a result, the insured was confronted with a hazard
which justified it in employing its own counsel for its pro-
tection - protection the insurer plainly indicated it would
not give. The insured met the hazardous situation by employ-
ing counsel under protest and notifying the insurer that it
must bear the expense.
As the hazard was created by the action of the insurer
in placing itself in a position in which it could not and did
not fully and completely perform its contractual obligation
to make defense, the insured is entitled to recover reason-
able attorney fees, and proper expenses on the ground that
insurer breached its contract .... The insurer, having agreed
in its contract of insurance to make defense at its own ex-
pense, could not in such manner pass part of the expense
thereof on to the insured. 12
During the course of its opinion the Court pointed out that the
question of coverage could not be finally determined until the injured
party's suit was concluded, and said:
Accordingly in respect to coverage the situation that con-
fronted the insurer in determining its course in defending
the Harper suit, related to potential rather than ultimate
liability for indemnification.13
Thus, it might be argued that the Socony-Vacuum rule has applica-
tion only where the issue of coverage is in doubt and cannot be re-
solved prior to the disposition of the injured party's suit. Further, it
has no application where the objective facts, known to both the in-
sured and the company, clearly reveal a lack of coverage for the loss.
12 144 Ohio St. at 396, 59 N.E.2d at 204-05 (1945).
13 Id.
[Vol. 23:423
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There is nothing in the language of the decision, however, that
would warrant such a conclusion. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the syllabus
of the case are phrased in absolute terms. They state:
3. A liability insurance company breaches its contract to
defend by making to the insured such a claim of nonliability
for indemnification as to render it impossible for such com-
pany, in making defense, to protect both its own interests
and those of the insured.
4. Where there is such a breach of contract, accompanied
by an invitation to insured to employ its own counsel to par-
ticipate in the defense for its own protection, the insured,
protesting against such action, may employ counsel with
notice to the insurance company that it must bear the ex-
pense, and the company will be liable for reasonable attorney
fees and proper expenses incurred in making defense. 14
The syllabus is the law of the case in Ohio, 15 and it is clear from the
language used therein that this rule applies whenever the conflict of
interest between the insured and the company is so great as to make
it impossible for the company to give equal attention to its own inter-
ests and those of the insured. Thus, the application of the rule does
not turn upon the result in the injured party's suit, but upon the
quality of the company's disclaimer of liability.
The Socony-Vacuum rule had the potential of a bomb,16 but its
effect has been that of the fizzle of a wet firecracker. Arguably, a
logical extension of the Rule could be that in a Socony-Vacuum con-
flicts situation the company has the duty of furnishing independent
counsel to the insured at the company's expense. But as far as can be
determined, this argument has not been made in any reported case.
At the very least, it could be argued that the company, in fulfillment
of its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,17 must not only
14 Id. at 382, 59 N.E.2d at 199.
"SCassidy v. Glossip, 12 Ohio St. 2d 17, 231 N.E.2d 64 (1967).
16I. Hart & W. Hart, Jr., Review of Ohio Case Law for 1945, 32 Ohio Ops. 467, 472-73
(1946):
The case of Socony-Vacuum Oil Company v. Continental Casualty Company ...
presents a problem of prime importance to attorneys representing casualty insur-
ance companies, and the actual decision leaves in doubt many questions concern-
ing the proper procedure to be followed when counsel is confronted with a situa-
tion such as was found in the instant case .... It is a matter of conjecture under
this decision how far an insurance company may safely go in defending under a
reservation of rights and still avoid the later possibility of having to pay its in-
sured's own personal counsel fees and costs.
7 Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
The courts of Ohio have not expressly recognized the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing but the embryo of such an implied covenant can be found in Netzley v. Na-
tionwide Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Ohio App. 2d 65, 296 N.E.2d 550 (1971);
(Continued on next page)
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inform the insured that he may have independent counsel to repre-
sent his interests, but also that the company will pay all reasonable
attorney fees and expenses incurred in such representation by inde-
pendent counsel. But again, as far as can be determined, no such
argument has been made in any reported case.18 As a matter of fact,
when the rule has been used in argument, it has been used inap-
positely,19 and in the only reported case in which it was used correctly,
the Supreme Court of Ohio shrugged it off with a platitude. Thus, in
Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Trainor,20 the Supreme Court said:
Finally, the Trainors argue that Motorists should pay addi-
tional attorney fees and expenses because of the conflict of
interest which they say will be inserted in the forthcoming
negligence action.
"When the insurer acts in good faith and considers the
welfare of the insured as well as its own, there is no real or
substantial conflict of interest." 1 Long, Law of Liability
Insurance, Section 5.06 [sic]. See Farm Bureau Mut. Auto
Ins. Co. v. Violano (Cir. 2, Vt. 1941), 123 F.2d 692, cer-
tiorari denied, 316 U.S. 672 [sic].21
(Continued from preceding page)
First, we feel that the underlying requirement attendant to an exercise of good
faith in the acts, conduct, and circumstances of the defense of an action, includ-
ing the negotiation for settlement of the claim, is that the insurer in the considera-
tion of the conflicting interests of both the insurer and the insured exert at least an
equal degree of attention and concern for the interests of the insured as it would
for its own interests in the matter. 34 Ohio App.2d at 73, 296 N.E.2d at 558.
18 Despite the fact that the language quoted from Netzley in note 16 supra would support
such an argument, it is questionable whether the argument would succeed. The Ohio Su-
preme Court has taken a very conservative view of the "good faith - bad faith" ques-
tion, as illustrated by the second paragraph of the syllabus of Slater v. Motorists Mutual
Ins. Co., 174 Ohio St. 148, 187 N.E.2d 45 (1962):
A lack of good faith is the equivalent of bad faith, and bad faith, although not
susceptible of concrete definition, embraces more than bad judgment or neg-
ligence. It imports a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, conscious wrongdoing,
breach of a known duty through some ulterior motive or ill will partaking of
the nature of fraud. It also embraces actual intent to mislead or deceive another.
The Court shows no inclination to budge from this position. Wasserman v. Buckeye Union
Cas. Co., 32 Ohio St. 2d 69, 290 N.E.2d 837 (1972). While it might be argued that the
failure to inform the insured that he may have independent counsel at the company's ex-
pense is a "breach of a known duty," it would be difficult to establish that it was "through
some ulterior motive or ill will partaking of the nature of fraud." Difficult, but in any
given case, not impossible; and the argument is there to be made.
19 In Toms v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 75 Ohio App. 181, 61 N.E.2d 98 (1945) and Travelers
Insurance Company v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Company, 88 Ohio L. Abs. 129, 178
N.E.2d 613 (Ct. App. 1961), it was used to support a claim for attorney fees and ex-
penses incurred by the insured after the company had absolutely refused to defend. While
the Socony-Vacuum rule certainly supports this position by logical inference, it has no
direct application to such a situation. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. General Accident
Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 23 Ohio App. 2d 263, 262 N.E.2d 885 (1970).
2033 Ohio St. 2d 41, 294 N.E.2d 874 (1973).
21 Id. at 47, 294 N.E.2d at 878, quoting 1 LONG LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE, Section
5.06., and citing Farm Bureau Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Violano, 123 F.2d 692 (2d Cit.
1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 672 (1942).
(Vol. 23:423
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Of course, this may be more than a mere platitude. It may be a
finding, albeit obscure, that no conflict exists, and thus there is no
occasion to apply the Socony-Vacuum rule.2 2 On the other hand, this
rather vague language may represent the view that the insured is
entitled to such fees and expenses only if there is a conflict of inter-
est. This question, however, cannot be determined until after the
injured party's action has been tried because it is not until such time
that the company's conduct can be fairly scrutinized. In other words,
a Socony-Vacuum action brought prior to the termination of the in-
jured party's action is premature because, until such time, it cannot
be determined that a conflict of interest did, in fact, exist.
If this latter point is what the Supreme Court did have in mind,
then it is, in effect, a repudiation of the Socony-Vacuum rule. While
it is true that in the Socony-Vacuum case the action to recover fees
and expenses was not brought until after the termination of the in-
jured party's suit, there was nothing in that case which would in-
dicate that the question could not be raised prior to that event. Rather,
just the opposite would appear to be the case. In Socony-Vacuum
the court emphasized that it was the denial of coverage plus the recom-
mendation to employ independent counsel that gave rise to a pre-
sumption of a conflict of interest which amounted to a breach of
contract. Thus, the cause of action accrued when the company gave
its notice. Of course, the exact amount of damages for the breach -
the attorney fees and expenses - could not be ascertained until the
termination of the injured party's suit, so in that sense, an action
for damages could not be brought until that time. But an action for
a declaratory judgment respecting the company's liability for such
fees and expenses should be available to the insured immediately upon
the breach; without it being available, the insured is not likely to be
22The injured party's action was for blindness resulting from a scuffle between the plaintiff
and the insured's son. The company took the position that there was no coverage since the
blow to the plaintiff's eye was an intentional act, and as such, was not a risk covered under
the insureds' homeowner's policy. It refused to defend the case unless the insureds entered
into a quasi-bilateral nonwaiver agreement. When the insureds failed to respond to this
offer, the company brought a declaratory judgment action in which they sought a declara-
tion to the effect that an assumption of the defense would not constitute a waiver or
estoppel with respect to the coverage issue. The insureds cross-petitioned for a declaration
that they were entitled to attorney fees for independent counsel, who would protect them in
what they stated to be a conflict of interest situation. In other words, they evoked the Socony-
Vacuum rule. The trial court did not pass on the conflict of interest question, but on ap-
peal, the Court of Appeals determined that a conflict of interest was present. The Supreme
Court may simply be reversing the Court of Appeals on this point without expressly saying
so. In any case, the Violano case cited by it has no application to this problem; it is merely
the source of the quotation taken from Long's Law of Liability Insurance.
In passing, it is interesting to note that the West Publishing Company took the view
that this remark simply meant that there was no apparent conflict of interest. Thus, the
10th headnote in its report of the case reads:
Insureds failed to establish entitlement to additional attorney fees and expenses
based on alleged conflict of interest with liability insurer anticipated with respect
to litigation of personal injury action. See 294 N.E.2d 874 at 875 (1973).
As will be demonstrated at a later point in this article, this explanation, while plaus-
ible, really misses the mark.
1974]
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able to take advantage of the Socony-Vacuum rule (unless he is
moneyed), because he could not otherwise pay independent counsel,
or have any way of assuring independent counsel that fees would be
forthcoming. If the Trainor gloss is read to preclude the bringing of
a declaratory judgment action until after the termination of the in-
jured party's suit, it will gut the Socony-Vacuum rule, and leave it
practically worthless as a device for protecting the rights and inter-
ests of the insured.23
Perhaps it is not necessary to become too concerned over this
particular interpretation of the Trainor platitude. First of all, no
part of the remark was carried over into the syllabus, so it is not
the law of the case and does not have much greater standing than
dictum.2 4 Second, there is a third explanation for the remark, which
will be dealt with at a later point in this article, which may obviate
the previous two explanations. Of course, if the reader finds this
third explanation unpersuasive, the prior two must be taken into
account.
Whatever the present status of the Socony-Vacuum rule may be,
it has not served much of a useful purpose. Obviously, it has not
endeared itself to the insurance companies, since it would require
them to bear a double expense in the defense of lawsuits, and they
23 A third party claim under Civil Rule 14 is equally unavailable to the insured. First of all,
we are stipulating a situation in which the company, through counsel, is defending the
action, and is controlling the defense of the action. Thus it is hardly likely that the com-
pany will permit a third party claim against itself, and this is especially true since it would
not want the jury to know that it was lurking in the background, no matter how confident
it might be with respect to its coverage defense. Secondly, even though the claim for ex-
penses and attorney fees is a claim in the nature of indemnity, it is not such as is con-
templated by Civil Rule 14. That Rule describes a third party claim as a claim against
[A] person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to [the third part
plaintiff] for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him.
While the company is not a parry to the action, the insured's claim for attorney fees and
expenses is no part of the injured parry's claim against the insured. If the company denied
coverage and absolutely refused to defend, then the insured would have a good third parry
claim; but that is not our case.
2Haas v. State, 103 Ohio St. 1, 132 N.E. 158 (1921):
[I] f that proposition of law had been embodied in the syllabus of that case, and
thereby the declaration of Sutliff, J., had become the declaration of the supreme
court of Ohio, it would become the duty of this court to either follow and ap-
prove the principle or overrule the same, but the court at that time did not see fit
to endorse the principle there laid down . . . . The proposition then does not
rise to the dignity of obiter by the court, but as an authority is entitled to such
credit only as the opinion of a single member of such court upon a subject not
before him for consideration. 103 Ohio St. at 7-8, 132 N.E. at 159-60.
See also Thackery v. Helfrich, 123 Ohio St. 334, 336, 175 N.E. 449, 450 (1931):
This court adheres to Rule VI of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court
(see Volume 122,Ohio State Reports, lxviii),and announces the law only through
the syllabi of cases and through per curiam opinions. Individual opinions
speak the conclusions of their writer. What useful purpose they serve is an open
question.
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have been very quiet about it.25 It has not been much used by in-
sureds, probably because it is unknown to them and their independent
counsel, in cases where they retain counsel. Further, as a rule most
insureds pass up the opportunity of retaining independent counsel
and rely upon the appointed defense counsel to represent their inter-
ests. Thus, the rule is potent in principle but impotent in practice,
and, from the point of view of the insured, it has been a most unsat-
isfactory device for solving the conflict of interest problem.
The Direct Action Development
From time to time it has been suggested that matters could be
greatly simplified if the injured party could sue the company directly,
with the company being either the sole defendant, or a joint defend-
ant with the insured, on the theory that the company is the real party
in interest.2 6 In general, the injured party is delighted with this de-
velopment, since there is some evidence that jurys return higher ver-
dicts when they know an insurance company has covered the risk.
27
Because of this, Ohio has always had a strong public policy against
direct actions against the insurance company.28 In recent years, how-
ever, the Ohio courts have taken a few tentative and hesitant steps
toward allowing a direct action against the company.
2 9
25 Unless, of course, the companies think they can use it to their own ends, as they attempted
to do in Travelers Insurance Company v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Company, 88 Ohio
L. Abs. 129, 178 N.E.2d 613 (Ct. App. 1961), and Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v
General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 23 Ohio App. 2d 263, 262 N.E.2d 885
(1970).
26 See, e.g., Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
2 Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744 (1959); Klaven,
The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L. J. 158 (1958).
29 Chitlik v. Allstate Ins. Co., 34 Ohio App. 2d 193, 299 N.E.2d 295 (1973):
In the trial of the case the fact that the defendant is covered by liability insur-
ance is deemed irrelevant and not admissible in evidence; and the disclosure of this
fact at any time is prejudicial to the defendant. Emrick v. Penna. Rd. Y.M.C.A.
(1942), 69 Ohio App. 353; Frank v. Corcoran (1926), 25 Ohio App. 356....
We therefore hold that personal injury actions must first be brought by the
injured party against the alleged tortfeasor. He is the one whose wrongdoing is
alleged to have caused the injury, and if the facts are found as alleged, he will
be primarily liable. Further, the policy of excluding any reference to the ex-
istence of insurance in an action to determine liability for personal injury would
be circumvented by permitting the injured person to sue the insurance company
and could constitute a prejudicial or harmful effect against the insurer. 34 Ohio
App. 2d at 195, 197, 299 N.E.2d at 297, 298.
Heuser v. Crum, 31 Ohio St. 2d 90, 285 N.E.2d 340 (1972):
From the foregoing, it becomes evident that the issue now presented is whether
the service obtained upon the decedent's liability insurer, under the facts before
us, was sufficient to commence appellant's action below.
By operation of law, the decedent's liability insurer is now the sole entity
that can be required to respond in possible damages to the appellant's allega-
tions. As such, it is the only defendant below which has any interest in the out-
come of this litigation. It arrives at this position by virtue of the contract it made
with the decedent and the consideration which supports that contract. The pres-
ence of a legal representative of the estate under these facts become perfunctory;
a methodical posture which is maintained out of a desire to obviate any possibility
(Continued on next page)
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A recent commentator 30 has suggested that the present Ohio Civil
Rules now permit the joinder of the company and the insured as
parties defendant in the injured party's action. The argument may
be summarized as follows: If the injured party obtains a judgment
against the insured, he must then file a supplemental action against
the company under the provisions of Section 3929.06 of the Ohio
Revised Code 31 if he wishes to collect that judgment from the com-
pany. But Civil Rule 18 (B) provides that:
Whenever a claim is one heretofore cognizable only after
another claim has been prosecuted to a conclusion, the two
claims may be joined in a single action....
And Civil Rule 20 (A) provides that:
All persons may be joined in one action as defendants if
there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the
alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out
of the same transaction, occurrence, or succession or series
of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or
fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.
Therefore, since the supplemental action is cognizable only after the
injured party's action has been prosecuted to conclusion, and since
the insured and the company have a common interest in the action,
the company may be joined as a party defendant.
The essential difficulty with the argument is that it is founded
on the false premise that in every case, in order to collect the judg-
ment, the injured party will have to bring a supplemental action
under Section 3929.06. As a matter of fact, such supplemental actions
are relatively rare. In the vast majority of cases the company either
settles the injured party's suit, or pays the judgment if one is obtained
against its insured.
(Continued from preceding page)
that the existence of an insurer as a party defendant could influence the verdict
of the jury....
It has not been alleged or shown that a failure to obtain service upon some
representative of the estate of Wetzel Crum would prejudice appellee State Farm
in any way in a trial on the merits of this case. 31 Ohio St. 2d at 93, 285
N.E.2d at 343.
See also Rasmussen v. Vance, 34 Ohio Misc. 87, 293 N.E.2d 114 (C.P. 1973). Both of
these situations are, of course, distinguishable from the ordinary civil action, but they may
point a trend.
30 McDonald, Joinder of Liability Insurers as Parties-Defendant - An Old Issue Reconsid-
ered Under Ohio's Civil Rules, 24 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 201 (1972). In support of
this position see 1 S. JACOBY, OHIO CIVIL PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES 167 (1970)
and J. MCCORMAC, OHIO CIVIL RULES PRACTICE §5.05, at 98 (1970). Contra, see RULES
ADVISORY COMMITTEE STAFF NOTES, PAGES OHIO REVISED CODE ANNOTATED, CIVIL
RULES 80 (1971): "Rule 18(B) is not intended to permit the joinder of a defendant's
liability insurer in the original tort action." See also Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Lattavo
Brothers, Inc., 9 F.R.D. 205 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
31 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2937.06 (Page 1960).
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Thus, the joinder of the company as a party defendant, with all
its attendant prejudice, although easing the burden of only a few
plaintiffs in a few cases, might substantially increase verdicts in all
cases because of that prejudice. Of course, the cost of the probable
increase in verdicts would only be passed on to the insuring public
in the form of higher premiums. It might well be asked whether the
majority of the populace should bear an increased financial burden
so that a relative few of their number may have their path to judg-
ment satisfaction eased. That is a question of public policy, and to
date, it has been answered in the negative.
Finally, another theory favoring the direct action against, or
joinder of, the company is bottomed on the thesis that the injured
party is a third party beneficiary of the liability insurance contract.32
This theory, too, has been rejected by the Ohio courts. 33
Accordingly, at the present time, the direct action against the
company, whether as the sole defendant or as a joint defendant with
the insured, is not available in this state. But even if it were, it would
not solve the conflict of interest problem. If the company were the
sole defendant in the action, it would be free to maneuver the de-
velopment of the facts so that the final judgment would preclude
coverage. If it is joined with the insured, and the insured is rep-
resented by independent counsel, the happy plaintiff has the same
"divide and conquer" situation that was found under the Socony-
Vacuum rule. Finally the situation may be such that the insured can-
not afford independent counsel, and is thus left to the mercy of the
company. Thus, the direct action is not a suitable solution to the con-
flicts problem.
The Declaratory Judgment Device and its Demise
Some states have taken the position that, where the objective
facts show coverage to be lacking, the company should not be obliged
to defend the action, even where the allegations of the complaint
bring the claim within the coverage of the policy. Representative of
this view is Burd v. Sussex Mutual Insurance Company,34 wherein
it is said:
32 Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
33Chitlik v. Allstate Ins. Co., 34 Ohio App. 2d 193, 299 N.E.2d 295 (1973). Paragraphs 1
and 2 of the syllabus read:
1. An injured person is not a third party beneficiary of a liability insurance con-
tract between an insurer and its insured and may not sue the insurer under that
theory.
2. An injured person may sue a tortfeasor's liability insurer, but only after ob-
taining judgment against the insured. R.C. 3929.05 and R.C. 3929.06.
56 N.J. 383, 267 A.2d 7 (1970).
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But when coverage, i.e., the duty to pay, depends upon a
factual issue which will not be resolved by the trial of the
third party's suit against the insured, the duty to defend may
depend upon the actual facts and not upon the allegations
in the complaint ...
But if the trial will leave the question of coverage
unresolved so that the insured may later be called upon to
pay, or if the case may be so defended by a carrier as to
prejudice the insured thereafter upon the issue of coverage,
the carrier should not be permitted to control the defense.
Whenever the carrier's position so diverges from the
insured's that the carrier cannot defend the action with com-
plete fidelity to the insured, there must be a proceeding in
which the carrier and the insured, represented by counsel
of their own choice, may fight out their differences. That
action may, as here, follow the trial of the third party's suit
against the insured. Or, unless for special reasons it would
be unfair to do so, a declaratory judgment proceeding may
be brought in advance of that trial by the carrier or the in-
sured, to the end that the third-party suit may be defended
by the party ultimately liable.
35
The essence of this view is that when the conflicts problem is
substantial, the company should not be permitted to defend unless
there is some other way in which the conflicts problem can be elim-
inated from the case. Several conflicts-elimination options are made
available to the company.
First, prior to the trial of the injured party's action, it may bring
a declaratory judgment action to have the coverage question re-
solved. If the declaration is in favor of coverage, the company is
bound by that declaration, and must defend the action with full
fidelity to the interests of the insured.
Second, if the company assumes the defense of the injured party's
action without qualification, it is estopped from later raising the ques-
tion of coverage, so it may just as well defend with a view to the in-
sured's interest alone.
Third, if the company defends under a reservation of rights, a
judgment in the injured party's action will not bind it on the ques-
tion of coverage, and it may later litigate that question in an action
on the policy. Since it will not be bound by the injured party's judg-
ment, it may defend with complete fidelity to the insured.
35 Id. at 388-91, 267 A.2d at 9-11.
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Finally if the conflicts problem is substantial, the company may
refuse to defend on the ground of lack of coverage and conflict of in-
terest. In such a case, it will not be bound by the judgment in the
injured party's action, but may litigate that question in an action on
the policy. Since it does not defend, the conflicts problem is eliminated
from the injured party's suit.36
Of these four options, only the first- the pre-trial declaratory
judgment action- is of importance here.
At first, Ohio did not permit the use of a declaratory judgment
action as a device for testing an insurer's duty to defend, on the
ground that such an issue did not raise a question of construction or
validity of the policy ;37 but within seven years of that holding, the
Ohio Supreme Court changed its mind. Thus, in paragraph 1 of the
syllabus of The Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Cochrane38 the court in-
dicated that:
[A] controversy between an insurer and his insured under
an automobile liability insurance policy as to the fact or ex-
tent of liability thereunder to persons injured as a result of
the operation of the insured automobile or as to the insurer's
obligation to defend the insured in an action for damages
against him is an actual or justiciable controversy deter-
minable by a declaratory judgment.39
The point is more clearly made in Ohio Farmers Indemnity Co. v.
Chames,40 where it is said:
Moreover, it has been held in a number of cases that the
pendency of an action or even the threat of an action affords
a sufficient basis to permit an insurer to invoke declaratory-
judgment statutes, where the object is to secure a deter-
mination as to the insurer's obligation to defend an action
or to pay a judgment which might be rendered in such
action. (Emphasis added.) 41
361d. at 394, 267 A.2d at 13:
[IIf the carrier does not defend the tort claim because a plaintiff's verdict will
not resolve the coverage problem in the insured's favor or because the carrier can-
not defend with complete fidelity to the insured's sole interest, then the carrier
may be heard upon the coverage issue in a proceeding upon the policy.
37 Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Heisel, 143 Ohio St. 519, 56 N.E.2d 151 (1944).
3 155 Ohio St. 305, 98 N.E.2d 840 (1951).
39 Id. at 306, 98 N.E.2d at 841.
40 170 Ohio St. 209, 163 N.E.2d 367 (1959).
"I Id. at 214, 163 N.E.2d at 371. In addition, the court indicated as follows:
The use of the declaratory judgment action to establish whether there was cover-
age under the provisions of a liability insurance policy has often been resorted
to by insurers in recent years. In many instances this type of action will deter-
(Continued on next page)
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The insured, of course, has equal access to the declaratory judgment,42
and it has been held that an excess carrier may use the device against
the primary carrier in order to test their respective duties to de-
fend. 43 The injured party may be made a party defendant to the
action," and should be, if the declaration is to bind him and preclude
him from bringing a subsequent supplemental action under Section
3929.06 of the Ohio Revised Code.
But it is this latter point that is symptomatic of the weakness of
the declaratory judgment device as a test of the company's duty to
defend - it is expensive. At least two of the parties to this triangle,
and more often than not, all three, are compelled to bear the financial
burden of two suits: the declaratory judgment action first, and then
later, the injured party's action. The average insured is seldom suf-
ficiently affluent to be able to fight both the injured party and his
own insurance company at the same time, and, as a consequence, he
is either at the mercy of the company in such a suit, or he is driven
into the arms of plaintiff's counsel, thereby laying himself open to a
later charge of collusion. Even to the company the declaratory judg-
ment device may be more expensive than a defense of the injured
party's action, even a defense under the Socony-Vacuum yoke. But in
the "big case" it may be the most advantageous device; a technical
coverage defense, later asserted, looks awfully shakey when placed
alongside a bad injury, a large verdict, and an insured who has no
assets from which that verdict may be satisfied. Accordingly, the
best move is to get out of the case before it goes to judgment, and the
declaratory judgment action is the best vehicle for accomplishing this.
While the declaratory judgment device has the virtue of cer-
tainty, its vice - economic wastefullness and oppression of the in-
sured - far outweigh that virtue. But whatever its virtues and
(Continued from preceding page)
mine in advance the advisability of instituting or continuing the prosecution of
negligence actions against the insured or others which may come within the pro-
tection of the policy and often accomplishes the speedier and more economical
disposition of cases of this kind and the avoidance of a multiplicity of actions.
Consequently, the remedy should be applied liberally whenever the result will
be to settle the controversy one way or the other. A primary purpose of the
declaratory judgment action is to serve the useful end of disposing of uncertain
or disputed obligations quickly and conclusively. Id. at 213, 163 N.E. at 371.
See also The Republic Indemnity Co. v. Durell, 105 Ohio App. 153, 151 N.E.2d 687
(1957).
42 Lessak v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. of New York, 168 Ohio St. 153, 151 N.E.2d 730
(1958).
43 Travelers Insurance Co. v. Buckeye Union Casualty Co., 81 Ohio L. Abs. 108, 160 N.E.2d
874 (C.P. 1959). Interestingly enough, when this case got to the Ohio Supreme Court it
served as the vehicle for the elimination of a substantial portion of the loading and un-
loading coverage provided by the standard automobile liability policies. See Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Buckeye Union Casualty Co., 172 Ohio St. 507, 178 N.E.2d 792 (1961).
44 Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Manley, 78 Ohio L. Abs. 362, 152 N.E.2d 691
(Ct. App. 1957).
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vices, the pre-trial declaratory judgment device may no longer be
used by the company in this state. It has been laid to rest by the de-
cision in Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Trainor.45
The bare bones of the case will suffice as an introduction to the
new rule. Motorists had issued a homeowners policy to the Trainors.
On June 7, 1966, their 11-year old son was involved in a childhood
fight with his 8-year old playmate, Thomas Harvilla. The fight left
Harvilla totally blind in one eye. The incident was properly reported
to Motorists, and that company began its investigation. In time, Har-
villa filed suit against the Trainors, the claim for recovery being prem-
ised on negligence. Suit papers were properly forwarded to Motor-
ists, but that company denied coverage on the ground that the blow
to Harvilla's eye was "voluntary." The company also refused to de-
fend the action unless the Trainors entered into a bilateral nonwaiver
agreement which gave the company the option of withdrawing from
the case at any time before or after judgment, without thereby in-
curring any liability for the judgment. The Trainors did not reply to
this proposal, and thereafter, a default judgment was taken in the
action. The Trainors then had their own counsel take up the defense
for them, but they continued to demand a defense from Motorists,
and informed Motorists that they would look to it for payment of the
judgment, if any, as well as for reimbursement of their attorney fees
and expenses.
At this point, Motorists filed a declaratory judgment action in
which it set up the pertinent policy provisions, denied coverage, ad-
mitted its duty to defend, and prayed for a declaration that its as-
sumption of the defense without the Trainors' assent to its proposed
nonwaiver agreement would not amount to a waiver of its right to
contest the coverage question, or work an estoppel against it on that
point.
The Trainors cross-petitioned for their attorney fees to date, as
well as attorney fees for independent counsel to protect them in the
conflict of interest situation - fees to which they claimed entitlement
under the Socony-Vacuum rule.
The trial court granted the declaration sought by Motorists, but
held Motorists liable for the defense costs to the date of judgment,
as well as for the Trainors' costs in the declaratory judgment action.
4s33 Ohio St. 2d 41, 294 N.E.2d 874 (1973).
46 The report of the decision does not give the language of the exclusion, but since the policy
was in effect in 1966, the probable language was: "Section II of this policy does not
apply: . . . (c) under coverages E and F, to bodily injury or property damage caused
intentionally by or at the direction of the insured." The exclusionary language presently
used in the standard form reads: "This policy does not apply: 1. Under Coverage E-
Personal Liability and Coverage; F-Medical Payments to Others! . . . (f) to bodily
injury or property damage which is either expected or intended from the standpoint of
the insured." The Trainors' 11-year old son qualified as an "insured" inasmuch as he was
a resident of their household.
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The court did not pass on the conflict of interest problem, and did not
award the Trainors their Socony-Vacuum fees and expenses. Motor-
ists appealed the award of fees and expenses, and the Trainors cross-
appealed on the denial of their request for Socony-Vacuum fees and
expenses.
The court of appeals affirmed on Motorists appeal, but - and
here the report of the decision is rather vague - apparently reversed
the trial court on the Trainors' cross-appeal, found a conflict of inter-
est to exist and, presumably, granted the Trainors' request for reim-
bursement of their costs and expenses in retaining independent counsel
to represent them in that conflicts situation. The case then went to the
Ohio Supreme Court.
With respect to Motorists' appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed
the court of appeals and the trial court, and in so doing laid down the
prohibition against pre-trial declaratory judgment actions. It con-
cluded that:
[A]lthough the policy between the Trainors and Motorists
provides that "the company shall defend any suit against
the insured" (emphasis added), the Common Pleas Court
and the Court of Appeals have well stated that the law does
not require an insurer to waive its contract rights when it
has a duty to defend, as follows: "The plaintiff Motorists
Mutual Insurance Company is obligated to defend the Train-
ors in the Harvilla action . . . in good faith toward its in-
sured, without waiving its right to assert at any later time
the policy defenses it believes it has." Motorists could re-
serve its right through a bilateral nonwaiver agreement with
the Trainors, or through a unilateral reservations of rights.
It chose to try to set up a bilateral nonwaiver agreement
even though the petition alleged a pure negligence action. ...
The policy and the tenor of the Harvilla petition gave
[the Trainors] a clear right to expect a defense by the
insurer, and the Trainors had paid a premium for this
service. ...
Motorists took the litigious course of filing the within
action for declaratory judgment; then, upon trial, stipulated
its responsibility to defend, which had been its requested
relief, and asked the trial court to make a determination of
its rights to pay under the policy before the negligence action
was litigated. This course of conduct is hardly what either
side bargained for under the terms of the policy. The Train-
ors had the right to a prompt and diligent defense under this
contract. We determine that Motorists had a duty to defend,
and failed to carry out that duty.47
47 33 Ohio St. 2d at 44-46, 294 N.E.2d at 877-878 (1973).
[Vol. 23:423
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol23/iss3/5
INSURER'S DUTY TO DEFEND
What can be made of all this? The following points seem obvious:
If the policy contains a stipulation that the company shall defend any
suit against its insured; and, if the insured has paid a premium for
this service; and, if the allegations of the complaint bring the claim
within the coverage provided by the policy; then the company is ob-
ligated to defend the suit; and, if it defends under a reservation of
rights or a nonwaiver agreement; then, it may assert at any later
time the policy defenses it believes it has; but, it may not take the
litigious course of filing a declaratory judgment action before trial of
the injured party's suit in order to contest its duty to defend and/or
its duty to provide coverage; and if it does, it breaches its contract
with the insured.
Accordingly, where the allegations of the complaint bring the
claim within the coverage provided by the policy, and thereby impose
upon the company the duty to defend, the company may not bring a
pre-trial declaratory judgment action to contest that duty. In short,
the pre-trial declaratory judgment device as a test of the company's
duty to defend is abolished.
But if the direct action against the company, or the joinder of
the company in the injurd party's suit, is unavailable, and if the
pre-trial declaratory judgment device is abolished, is the only solu-
tion to the conflicts problem the unsatisfactory Socony-Vacuum rule?
No, because not even that survives the Trainor decision.
The Ultimate Solution - The Absolute Duty to Defend
Some courts have taken the position that when a claim falls
within the broad coverage of the policy, the company has an abso-
lute duty to defend. The conflict of interest problem is avoided by
the further holding that if the company defends under a reservation
of rights, it will not be bound on the coverage issue by the judgment
in the injured party's suit, but may litigate that issue at a later time.
Typical of the reasoning in support of this thesis is the following
from Gray v. Zurich Insurance Company:4
Although insurers have often insisted that the duty arises
only if the insurer is bound to indemnify the insured, this
very contention creates a dilemma. No one can determine
whether the third party suit does or does not fall within
the indemnification coverage of the policy until that suit is
resolved; . . . The carrier's obligation to indemnify inevit-
ably will not be defined until the adjudication of the very
action which it should have defended. Hence the policy con-
tains its own seeds of uncertainty; the insurer has held out
a promise that by its very nature is ambiguous ....
165 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966).
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Since we must resolve uncertainties in favor of the in-
sured and interpret the policy provisions according to the lay-
man's reasonable expectations .... we hold that in the present
case the policy provides for an obligation to defend and that
such obligation is independent of the indemnification cover-
age .... Similarly, we find no merit in the insurer's third
contention that our holding will embroil it in a conflict of
interests. According to the insurer our ruling will require
defense of an action in which the interests of insurer and
insured are so opposed as to nullify the insurer's fulfillment
of its duty of defense and of the protection of its own
interests ...
Since, however, the court in the third party suit does
not adjudicate the issue of coverage, the insurer's argument
collapses....
In any event, if the insurer adequately reserves its right
to assert the noncoverage defense later, it will not be bound
by the judgment. If the injured party prevails, that party
or the insured will assert his claim against the insurer. At
this time, the insurer can raise the noncoverage defense pre-
viously reserved. In this manner the interests of insured and
insured in defending against the injured party's primary
suit will be identical; the insurer will not face the suggested
dilemma.49
The Trainor decision places Ohio squarely within this camp.
As was shown above, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated that
when the allegations of the complaint bring the claim within policy
coverage, the company has an absolute duty to defend. If it defends
under a proper reservation of rights or a nonwaiver agreement, it
may litigate the question of coverage at a later time, but its duty to
defend is absolute. These points are manifested in paragraphs 1 and
2 of the syllabus, which are here quoted in reverse order to better
illustrate the proposition.
2. The test of the duty of an insurance company, under a
policy of liability insurance, to defend an action against an
insured, is the scope of the allegations of the complaint in
the action against the insured, and where the complaint
brings the action within the coverage of the policy the
insurer is required to make defense, regardless of the ulti-
mate outcome of the action or its liability to the insured.
(Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 144 Ohio
St. 382, approved and followed [sic]) (emphasis added).
49ld. at 268-270, 419 P.2d at 173-75, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 109-10.
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1. An insurance company, which by contract is obligated to
defend its insured in a negligence action, may defend in
good faith without waiving its right to assert at a later time
the policy defenses it believes it has, provided that it gives
its insured notice of any reservation of rights (emphasis
added) .50
But if the company does defend when the objective facts indicate
a lack of coverage, is it not in the same conflicts situation, and should
not the Socony-Vacuum rule apply? The Trainors thought so, and thus
asked for additional attorney fees and expenses. And this brings us
to that enigmatic remark that gave so much difficulty in the first part
of this article. It should be remembered that the Court said:
Finally, the Trainors argue that Motorists should pay addi-
tional attorney fees and expenses because of the conflict of
interest which they say will be inserted in the forthcoming
negligence action.
"When an insurer acts in good faith and considers the
welfare of the insured as well as its own, there is no real
or substantial conflict of interest." 1 Long, Law of Liability
Insurance, Section 5.06. See Farm Bureau Mut. Auto Ins.
Co. v. Violano (Cir. 2, Vt. 1941), 123 F.2d, 692, certiorari
denied, 316 U.S. 672 [siC].51
In understanding this remark it should first be noted that the
quote from Long, as well as the cited case, is inapposite. When put
in context,52 the quote has reference to the company's duty with
respect to settlement, and not to the defense of the action against
the insured. The Violano case likewise has to do with settlement, not
defense. Thus, the quote is not to be taken literally, rather, it is sym-
bolic of a principal.
When this is understood, and when the quote is read in conjunc-
tion with paragraph 1 of the syllabus, its meaning becomes clear.
The company has an absolute duty to defend. Assuming a proper
reservation of rights, if the company defends in "good faith," that is,
if it puts forth its best effort on behalf of the insured, there can be
no conflict of interest, since it will not be bound by any judgment in
the injured party's suit, but may litigate the question of coverage at
5033 Ohio St. 2d 41, 294 N.E.2d 874 (1973).
1 Id. at 47, 294 N.E.2d at 878.
521 R. LONG, LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE, §5.06, at 5-47 (Rel. No. 2) (1973). The
full quote reads:
When an insurer acts in good faith and considers the welfare of the insured as
well as its own, there is no real or substantial conflict of interest. In such a situa-
tion an insurer cannot be required to settle rather than litigate a doubtful issue;
nor is the insurer required in such a situation to bear the excess if the defense
fails and the verdict exceeds the policy limits.
And cited in support of this proposition is the Violano case.
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a later time. Therefore, since there can be no conflict of interest
when the company acts in this sense of the term good faith, there is
no requirement that the insured obtain independent counsel and no
need to award the insured attorney fees and expenses for that inde-
pendent counsel. In addition, since there is no longer need for inde-
pendent counsel as long as the company is acting in good faith, there
is no longer any need for the Socony-Vacuum rule. It must neces-
sarily follow, then, that the Trainor decision has likewise done away
with the Socony-Vacuum rule as well as the pre-trial declaratory judg-
ment device. 53
At this point, it might be well to ask: when is this "later time"
when the coverage question will be decided? If the insured is suc-
cessful in the injured party's action there will be no "later time," since
there will be no need to test the coverage provisions; he will have
been provided with a defense, and he will have incurred no costs in
that regard. On the other hand, if the injured party is successful, and
the verdict is such that the company, in its own economic interest, is
not willing to compromise or pay it, the logical "later time" is in the
supplemental action over under the provisions of Section 3929.06.5
It has long been held that the company may assert, in that supple-
mental action, any coverage defenses that it may have.55 Further,
since the supplemental action is a continuation of the principle
action, and because the company becomes a new party defendant
thereto, the insured, as the defendant in the principle action, may
cross-claim against the company under the provisions of Civil Rule
13(G), and thereby, dispose of all of the claims concerning cover-
age in a single action.
53 Of course, the Socony-Vacuum does not disappear entirely. It becomes resurrected and
applicable if the company begins to act in "bad faith" in the defense of the insured.
54 In its essential elements, that statute provides:
Upon the recovery of a final judgment against any . person . . .by any person,
...if the defendant in such action was insured against loss or damage at the
time when the rights of action arose, the judgment creditor or his successor in
interest is entitled to have the insurance money provided for in the contract
of insurance between the insurance company and the defendant applied to the
satisfaction of the judgment. If the judgment is not satisfied within thirty days
after it is rendered, the judgment creditor or his successor in interest, to reach
and apply the insurance money to the satisfaction of the judgment, may file a
supplemental [complaint] in the action in which said judgment was rendered,
in which the insurer is made new party defendant in said action, and whereon
service of summons upon the insurer shall be made and returned as in the com-
mencement of an action at law. Thereafter the action shall proceed as to the
insurer as in an original action.
ss See paragraph 1 of the syllabus of Bennett v. Swift & Co., 170 Ohio St. 168, 163 N.E.2d
362 (1959):
The rights of the plaintiff against an insurer named a defendant in a supple-
mental petition filed under the provisions of Section 3929.06, Revised Code,
cannot rise above those of the insured, and any defenses which would have been
available to the insurer in an action by the insured are available to the insurer
in the proceeding on such supplemental petition. (Luntz et al., Exrs., v. Stern,
135 Ohio St., 225, Stacey v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 114 Ohio
St. 633.)
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INSURER'S DUTY TO DEFEND
Finally, a word must be said about the company's duty to settle,
if a settlement offer is made within the policy limits. Assuming all
of the requisites for the imposition of the "good faith" duty to set-
tle, it would seem that when the company is defending under a
Trainor compulsion, it has absolutely no duty to accept a settlement
offer. It would be wholly inconsistent to demand that the company
defend with the promise that it can litigate the coverage question "at
a later time," and at the same time demand that it settle the case, if
settlement would be in the best interest of the insured. The demand
to settle would make a mockery of the whole process; the promise
with respect to the coverage question would be a hollow promise and
at least a cruel deception if not an outright hoax. But, as it is said in
Netzley,56 the company must keep the insured fully informed of any
settlement offers. Then, if the insured feels that a settlement is to his
best advantage, he may accelerate the determination of the coverage
question by means of a declaratory judgment action. The Trainor
prohibition against the declaratory judgment device is applicable to
the company only, not to the insured. He remains free to use that
device as he sees fit. If the coverage question is determined against
the company, then it must consider the settlement offer in "good
faith ;" but as long as the coverage question remains open, it has no
duty to accept such a settlement offer.
Thus, in Ohio, the solution to the conflict of interest problem is
the company's absolute duty to defend every case in which the allega-
tions of the complaint bring the claim within the policy coverage.
This is somewhat unfair to the company, but it is in a better position
to meet the economic burden than is the insured, since it need only
make some slight premium adjustment. In any case, with the advent
of no-fault automobile liability insurance, the economic burden on
the company will be substantially lessened.
Conclusion
The Trainor decision is a radical new approach to the liability
insurer's duty to defend lawsuits brought against its insured. In ad-
dition, it is the most fair and equitable way of solving the conflict of
interest problem that sometimes occurs in the exercise of that duty
to defend. Under the Trainor rule, the company has an absolute duty
to defend whenever the allegations of the complaint bring the claim
within the policy coverage, even when the objective facts known to
both the company and the insured clearly indicate that the claim does
56 See Netzley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Ohio App. 2d 65, 296 N.E.2d 550 (1971):
In addition, we hold to the view that an offer of settlement of the claim at, or
near, the policy limits should be conveyed to the insured- this for the purpose
of giving the insured the opportunity to engage in the discussion of a settle-
ment, and to make appropriate offers of contribution toward settlement. 34 Ohio
App. 2d at 74, 296 N.E.2d at 559.
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not arise out of a risk covered by the policy. If the company defends
under a reservation of rights, or under a nonwaiver agreement to
which the insured freely consents,57 the company does not waive the
coverage defense, nor is it estopped from raising it at a later time.
Rather, it has the express right to assert that coverage defense in
the injured party's supplemental action under the provisions of Sec-
tion 3929.06. Since the company may raise the coverage defense in
the supplemental action, it does not have any conflict of interest with
the insured in the defense of the injured party's action. Further, as
long as the company defends that action in "good faith," that is, as
long as it puts forth its best efforts on behalf of the insured, the in-
sured has no need of independent counsel. Accordingly, the Socony-
Vacuum rule of reimbursement for independent counsel's attorney
fees and expenses is set aside, and remain inoperable as long as the
company is defending in "good faith." Also, since the question of
coverage is postponed until the supplemental action, the company is
forbidden to employ the pre-trial declaratory judgment action as a
device for testing the duty to defend. But that prohibition flows to
the company only, not to the insured. While the company need not
accept a settlement offer while the coverage question remains open,
the insured may employ the declaratory judgment device to test
coverage at an early stage and, if successful, impose upon the com-
pany the good faith duty of entertaining the settlement offer.
57 As it is noted in paragraph 3 of the syllabus of Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Trainor
33 Ohio St. 2d 41, 294 N.E.2d 874 (1973):
Where a clear duty to defend an action against an insured is admitted by the
insurer, and is obvious from the complaint filed, the insurer cannot excuse itself
from that duty by seeking to require the insured to enter into a bilateral non-
waiver agreement as a condition precedent to making such a defense.
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